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Introduction 
 
Emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs) conduct their domestic business in a difficult 
environment characterized by inefficient or missing market mechanisms. Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc (2008) emphasize that this disadvantage can switch to an advantage, because the ability 
for the EMNEs to ‘sail’ in such environment makes them stronger against other type of 
companies when it comes to invest in countries which presents the same conditions. While 
underdeveloped institutions make it harder for companies to operate in terms of resource 
seeking, including knowledge and skilled labor force (Latukha 2014), this domestic 
experience helps EMNEs to develop specific sets of capabilities, which allow them to be 
more successful, than developed market firms in such environments (Gaur, Kumar, and 
Sarathy 2011). 
While the literature on the competitiveness of EMNEs is expanding rapidly as is the 
amount of the EMNEs, sharp and definite conclusions are still missing on how these 
companies actually generate competitive advantages (CAs) over the more developed MNEs. 
Some effects arisen from properties of the home country or the effect that emerging market 
has on the company have been proven but the list will definitely lengthen by research done in 
near future. 
The role of a government can be seen as both advantage and disadvantage in the 
internationalization process of national firms and turns out to be especially important 
determinant for EMNEs (Wang 2012). The strongest impact on this is the implementation of 
specifics policies, which orient and help the companies to start business in the international 
market. Gaur, Kumar and Singh (2014) posit that the institutional environment of emerging 
markets does not only affect the way resources can be acquired, developed or exploited 
domestically, but also influences the international operations of emerging market firms. 
Otherwise, an emerging market supposes a sensitive political structure as well, and the 
governments are not always democratic there. Hence, the role of a government can be the 
same as in the developed countries; however, the different context may dramatically change 
the implication of these regulations. 
In order to provide an empirical support for investigating how the home government 
influences internationalization of domestically grown EMNEs we use Russian context, which 
has several explanations. First, Russia is the major outward investor among emerging 
economies with the second largest stock of OFDI before the global financial crisis 
(Panibratov and Kalotay 2009) and Russian firms have affiliates all over the world. Second, 
Russian MNEs demonstrate a wide range of strategies and, thus, represent a suitable ground 
to verify the validity of theoretical arguments for an examination of the government 
involvement in shaping strategies pursued by MNEs from a single national context. Third, 
Russia is one of the least examined economies in the emerging market literature and this 
paper would contribute to the knowledge of the specific features of Russian MNEs’ 
international expansion.  
Russia is an increasingly growing outward investor, with investment climate, corruption 
and administrative barriers being more problematic in Russia than in the rest of BRICS. 
Settles and Gurkov (2011) argue that Russia’s state encourages firms to invest their surplus of 
capital in foreign business attempting to improve these firms image and to acquire more 
economic control in international market. 
We provide evidence of Russian MNEs in different industries that have expanded 
globally over last decade and have become well-established players in a highly competitive 
international business arena. Although previous studies have started addressing this 
phenomenon in context of Chinese and Indian MNEs, Russian firms can offer a fertile ground 
for further theoretical extension.  
During last decade, the number of Russian MNEs increased significantly (Panibratov 
2012). In line with Jormanainen and Koveshnikov (2012), we argue that there is a need to 
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better comprehend different types of competitive advantages of emerging market firms and 
their nature. Thus, in this paper we attempt to fill this gap and to reveal the nature and the 
source of Russian MNEs’ competitive advantage with the special attention paid to the role of 
the home government in the internationalization process of Russian MNEs. 
In this research, the main questions is: to what extent and how does the combination of 
the home government’ interest and control influence Russian MNEs? To answer this question, 
we develop the framework that explains the existing heterogeneity in the government 
influence on the internationalization Russian firms. 
 
The role of government in internationalization of EMNEs 
 
Government involvement in outward internationalization of EMNEs 
 
Despite being widely recognized as the general characteristic of all the economies that are 
quickly growing, being recently at the low stage of the development, the term ‘emerging 
economies’ is often related to markets that are in transition process from centrally planned to 
market economy. China is the most prominent example of this growth, which is why the most 
of research in this area explore the Chinese context. Other emerging countries have witnessed 
much less evidence of the international activity of domestic firms. This is why we will depart 
from the Chinese experience. 
Gugler and Boie (2008), trying to explain how Chinese government explores OFDI to 
develop the national economy, found that most of these investments were made by state-
owned enterprises (SOE) and this trend is growing. The government of China plays a strong 
role in the outward investments (particularly, OFDI have to be approved by the government in 
order to be in line with the national policies), as well as in the internationalization of Chinese 
firms.  
Lu, Liu and Wang (2010) found that the government support has direct and indirect 
effects on the motives of Chinese firms towards OFDI. Generally, the findings indicate that 
the institutional environment formed by government should be considered as an important 
determinant of OFDI. More specifically, although supportive policies and upgrading 
institutional framework can positively influence Chinese companies to involve in OFDI, 
political interests and financial support can have negative consequences. Luo, Xue and Han 
(2010) also noted the significance of government actions - rules and regulations - in providing 
a steady and supportive institutional setting for OFDI. 
Goldstein and Pusterla (2008) argue that FDI mainly driven by opportunities and 
challenges (e.g., cost of operations, trade conditions) and by the home country’s 
characteristics (e.g., government policies). The retrospective view shows that ‘BRIC’ 
governments have different influence on the OFDI dynamics. One pole here is China where 
an outward expansion is impossible without the state’s approval and even WTO recently tried 
to convince China to facilitate the companies to go abroad. Another pole is Brazil, where the 
government has not managed for an efficient OFDI policy, but companies go abroad much 
easier. This better dynamic of Brazilian FDI is partly explained with the activity of APEX 
(export agency) which helps national firms to find their CA for foreign markets, and with new 
financing programs by a National Bank providing a better access for companies to the 
international market. 
For Chinese firms the major institutional factors or changes in them, which have 
affected the internationalization process, have been the home government's industrial policy 
and the induction of China into the WTO in 2001. The Chinese government's industrial policy 
focuses on the organization of the inward FDI in such a manner, that state controlled 
enterprises (SCEs) received foreign capital, technology, management systems and other 
benefits through licensing agreements, joint ventures and other strategic alliances formed with 
western enterprises investing in the country. Via these alliances and contracts, the Chinese 
7 
 
SCE's were able to adopt the latest technologies, market knowledge, international contacts, 
networks and foreign capital to prepare for their own international operations. (Yang et al., 
2009) 
Yaprak and Karademir (2010) continue by noting, that the environmental uncertainties 
at home or target market, such as in economic policy orientation of the state, influence the 
competitiveness of a country's firms and therefore the internationalization process of these 
firms. They refer to Indian firms that are affected by the political, legal and societal changes 
in Indian institutions, and must develop their strategies accordingly. Especially in case of 
India, where formal institutions are underdeveloped, informal institutions such as personal 
relationships play a noticeably larger role in Indian companies' internationalization processes. 
As another example, they mention Turkish business groups and their internationalization 
process, compare it to some global competitors, such as Samsung, Tata and Haier, and explain 
why the Turkish firms have not been as successful. Firstly there have been several periods of 
economic and political turbulence and uncertainty in which the firms have evolved; secondly 
it is due to over-diversification and over-protection that they enjoyed due to the government 
protection, which caused the firms to not be internationally competitive (Yaprak and 
Karademir 2010).  
In order to encourage the companies to internationalize, government may try to improve 
an investment climate domestically, acting ‘locally’ to help MNEs with ‘global’ 
achievements. In India, the government took the decision to raise the state employees pay, 
erase the debts of small farmers and develop the rural-workfare. Despite these actions cost a 
lot and are focused internally, it improves an image of a country and reassures the Indian 
MNEs. 
From this analysis, we can reason that in case the government is over protective of the 
national companies and competition, a situation can arise where the national firms lack the 
knowledge and capabilities for being successful operators in an international setting. 
However, when the home government accepts and patronizes foreign competition, the 
national companies have to adapt and learn and will therefore be better equipped for 
international operations of their own. 
 
Russian context 
 
Russia is relatively young outward investor and the government policies are not clear yet. The 
investment climate, the corruption and the administrative barriers are more problematic in 
Russia than in the rest of BRIC. Settles and Gurkov (2011) argue that Russia’s state 
encourages firms to invest their surplus of capital in foreign business attempting to improve 
these firms image and to acquire more economic control in international market. 
At the end of the 2000s, Russia had the second largest stock of OFDI among the 
emerging economies (USD 203 billion in 2008) (Panibratov and Kalotay 2009). The 
prototypes of Russian multinationals already existed in the times of the Soviet Union (so 
called ‘red multinationals’), and the government exercised strict control upon these 
enterprises, which were all state owned. A majority of these firms was involved in supporting 
country’s exports abroad (raw resources marketing, infrastructure support, banking, 
insurance, etc.). After the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, these companies were 
mostly privatized and restructured, and their assets were consolidated inside the country. 
These transformations made possible a further interest of these firms in an oversea expansion. 
The second wave of the internationalization of Russian firms started at the end of the 
1990s, with cross-border M&A being the most popular form. However, there were also large 
greenfield projects as well as brownfield deals. Compared to cross-border M&A, greenfield 
projects conducted by Russian firms were smaller in both size and scope (Kalotay and 
Sulstarova 2010). 
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As the most common destinations for Russian OFDI are CIS and Eastern European 
countries (Filippov and Duysters 2011) there is a possibility of Russian MNEs having an 
advantage of originating from developing economy and operating in a familiar environment, 
hostile to developed countries MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). Western MNEs that 
invested to Russia within two last decades, conducted orientation to high quality of 
production and services, the effective marketing policy adapted for Russia, and local 
partnerships (Panibratov 2009). Hence, benefits from their operations were not only financial 
but also of knowledge character for Russian MNEs.  
Motives of EMNEs internationalization are considered to be the same as those of 
companies from developed economies with market, labor, resource and technology seeking 
prevailing over the rest (Rasiah, Gammeltoft, and Jiang 2010), although again, in case of 
Russia resource and market seeking motives are most often stated as the main ones, but with 
little respect to industry specifics (Panibratov and Verba 2011). OFDI from Russia is both 
‘exodus’ and ‘expansion’ in terms of the role of both home-country factors that encourage 
firms to invest abroad and the attractiveness of foreign locations for Russian firms (Vahtra 
and Liuhto 2006). Exodus was strong in early 1990s (at the beginning of the transition), 
followed by less escape in the mid-1990s; the crisis of 1998 prompted a rise in capital escape, 
and then normalization again; the crisis of 2008 increased the motivation of exodus once 
again. 
The international expansion of Russian firms is closely connected with reforms 
implemented during the last two decades: privatization and attempts to implement industrial 
restructuring to catch-up with technological developments are amongst the most important. 
Sector development has not been equal while the state has supported some industries, leaving 
others without incentives and possibilities for growth. In Russia, mass privatization has led 
only to a gradual transformation of production networks. The core ‘technology’ of 
privatization in Russia was the ‘corporatization’ of large and medium size enterprises by 
converting them into joint stock companies prior to their restructuring.
.
 The aim was to make 
enterprise independent of state administration, delimit the size of its ownership, and separate 
shareholders from management. In the privatisation program, large and medium-sized 
enterprises have played the main roles. 
The state has played an important role in the emergence of Russian OFDI. State-owned 
enterprises possess a set of advantages (financial capabilities, access to loans from the central 
bank, administrative support, etc.) that facilitate their internationalization. At the same time, 
even in fully or partly privatized enterprises, state influence remains, sometimes directly (for 
example through residual ownership) and sometimes indirectly, significant. However, the 
state influence varies across industries, being particularly strong in the energy sector and 
taking only indirect form in others through incentivizing their development. 
While an official explanation of the current motives of Russia’s OFDI is the search for 
markets and resources (Vale Columbia Centre 2009), such a drive as seeking strategic assets, 
image-building or insurance motives are also amongst the important reasons. The desire of 
Russian firms’ owners and managers to mitigate the economic and political risks in their 
home market by holding assets offshore related to ‘system escape’ motives, which decreased 
sharply after 1999 but bounced back during the global crisis. Aspirations for a better global 
recognition and an improved image abroad have also been among the motives of Russia’s 
OFDI (Panibratov and Kalotay 2009). 
 
Methodology 
 
Selecting industries and firms  
 
The main objective of our research was to understand how the government could shape the 
competitive advantage for Russian companies. The logic behind our empirical study was to 
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analyze the internationalization strategies of Russian companies in those industrial sectors 
that witness an expansion overseas and to draw conclusions on how they are influenced by 
home government involvement. In our analysis, we use the broad variety of data on 
internationalization strategies of firms in order to draw conclusions. Specifically, we followed 
three steps in the analysis. First, we examined sector-specific factors and institutional forces 
affecting the sectoral development (we have relied on secondary and primary data sources to 
make this examination). Second, based on the results of this analysis we classified sectors 
included into this study into four groups according to two main criteria: the interest of the 
government in the development of the sector and the degree of state control of the firms in the 
sector (we have developed this framework based on the first step of the analysis). Third, we 
analyzed the strategies within each of these groups in order to verify an existence of certain 
similarities of internationalization strategies under the governmental influence and described 
the main features of revealed patterns of internationalization of firms in each group (mostly 
primary data have been used for this part of the analysis). 
In this study, we analyzed the internationalization strategies of 35 firms in fifteen 
industrial sectors, representing three big groups. The first consists of large Russian MNEs 
appearing in top global rankings, and operating in the oil and gas, electricity, mining, 
metallurgy, and banking industries. The second group includes the companies servicing 
clients in IT, telecommunications, military, automotive, logistics and construction sectors, and 
implementing internationalization attempts, yet on a significantly smaller scale. The third 
group is represented by firms in mass media, education, sport and fast food sectors, which are 
rather ‘virtual’ than ‘normal’ internationalizers; despite having some experience of operating 
abroad these organizations are still carefully testing foreign waters. 
The data has been collected during 2 years from several sources: secondary data 
analysis and observations (mass media, companies’ reports, etc.) and personal in-depth 
interviews with CEOs and middle managers of selected companies. We have approached the 
top management teams in search for those CEOs who have been in charge of international 
decisions of companies. We were also interested in discussions with line managers who have 
taken part in the international projects. Nevertheless, our focus on top managers was proofed 
by their strategic position within a firm and direct impact on decision-making.  
The sectors included in the analysis (in total fifteen) are: automotive, banking, 
construction, education, electricity, fast food, IT, logistics, media, metallurgy, military, 
mining, oil and gas, sport and telecoms. In each of these sectors we have selected two–three 
firms for the analysis of the governmental impact on the internationalization strategies. We 
have used a purposeful sampling approach in the final case selection by including those firms 
that were considered as being effective on international markets, and have shown significant 
internationalization results. The selected companies are most often mentioned in the official 
reports, research papers, and media as the prototypes of Russian MNEs or as active pretenders 
for status of ‘internationalizers’ – this was an additional argument for us to take this sample. 
 
Developing theoretical framework 
 
The data analysis allowed us to develop the theoretical framework reflecting an integrative 
influence of two critical determinants on the formation of the CAs of Russian MNEs. The 
discussion in this section describes the logic behind this framework. To evaluate the role of 
the state, we asked our respondents what they considered to be the most important criteria of 
this role. The two most frequent answers were control (which can be measured by the stake of 
the government in the company’s ownership and by the status of the state representative in the 
company’s board) and interest (primarily characterized by the number and quality of 
incentives provided to the companies). Asking our respondents how they evaluated these 
criteria, from 0 (no control/interest) to 10 (the maximum of control/interest), we received two 
ranks for each sector analyzed (Fig.1).  
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Figure 1 Evaluating the role of the state in different industries 
 
Industry Control by the state Interest of the state 
Automotive 
Banking 
Construction 
Education 
Electricity 
Fast food 
IT 
Logistics 
Media 
Metallurgy 
Military 
Mining 
Oil and gas  
Sport 
Telecoms 
4.8 
4.9 
3.1 
6.9 
9.7 
2.2 
3.4 
2.7 
8.3 
4.6 
8.8 
8.6 
9.8 
6.2 
4.6 
3.3 
8.2 
4.6 
4.4 
9.9 
2.1 
5.9 
3.0 
5.7 
8.3 
9.6 
9.6 
10 
2.5 
7.4 
 
 
 
As we can see from the figure, some industries are of maximum interest to the state and 
highly controlled by the government (oil and gas, electricity, mining and military). This 
reflects both the economic and the political importance of these sectors for the Russian state. 
At the other extreme, automotive, construction, fast food and logistics are of minimal 
importance and do not require any significant control, with the exception of a few region-
significant employers such as AvtoVAZ in Tolyatti or GAZ in Nizhniy Novgorod. We present 
a more detailed look at the above results in Fig. 2, and explain the two-sided role of the 
government for these groups of firms.  
Using this framework, we also argue that the international strategy of Russian MNEs 
should be analyzed as an outcome of the influence of two groups of government-related 
determinants at the industry and the firm level. 
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Figure 2 Grouping of companies according the state role 
 
  Interest of the state 
  High Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
by the 
state 
High 1. Electricity; military; mining; 
oil and gas 
The industries in this group are 
important strategically (from the 
economic and political standpoints) 
for the country, hence the interest 
of the state in these sectors is great.  
In these industries, the state strictly 
controls the operations of the 
companies. The capital 
requirements are extremely high 
due to the complications and extent 
of infrastructure, which is, in turn, 
also complicated and expensive. 
3. Education; media; sport 
These industries are much more 
important politically and socially 
than economically, i.e. the state 
benefits from the opportunity to 
influence the home country’s 
population, or other countries’ 
governments. 
The state closely supervises these 
companies’ activities, while an 
extensive and complicated 
infrastructure is not required. 
However, the capital requirement 
can be relatively high to assure 
growth. Technology requirements 
are relatively low. 
 
Low 
 
2. Banking; IT; metallurgy; 
telecom 
The state is really interested in the 
development of these sectors of the 
economy due to the highly 
representative character of their 
image. The capital and 
infrastructure requirements are 
moderate. The government 
understands the self-sufficiency of 
these firms, which can invest in 
internationalization independently 
of the state. Hence, the government 
does not directly control the 
operations of firms in these sectors. 
4. Automotive; construction; fast 
food; logistics 
The infrastructure and capital 
requirements are medium to low in 
these sectors. The state is not 
interested in the development of 
these sectors – although formally it 
often shows concern for companies 
in a particular industry (e.g. the 
automotive industry) – and avoids 
control of these firms’ operations. 
The technology requirements are 
relatively high, the ‘good’ 
technology may compensate for the 
lack of financial resources for 
growth. 
 
The integration of industry level determinants allows for addressing the limitations in 
the theorizing on the internationalization strategies of EMNEs as they shed light on logic 
behind the existence of certain patterns in EMNEs’ strategies, which, in turn, help to 
comprehend their diversity and to implement a comparison across various national contexts. 
Indeed, firms in a particular sector experience similar resource, technology and institutional 
constraints and incentives, most of which are pre-determined by the high interest of the state 
in the development of the particular industry (e.g. of the strategic priorities such as energy or 
defense) or by the lack of such (examples are automotive or construction). Within this set of 
constraints and incentives, firms follow the strategy based on their own resources and 
capabilities and attempt to deal with other types of micro-level pressures originating from the 
government involvement in decision making and operations abroad. 
This framework also accounts for another limitation associated with the mixed role of 
institutions by illustrating the different levels and types of institutional impact. The 
importance of integrating macro- and micro-institutions has been emphasized in other recent 
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studies (e.g. Dunning and Lundan 2008), who make explicit integrated, institutionally based 
advantages into internationalization framework. 
There are several important implications of this framework. First, it explains how 
multiple-level government-related influences result in different internationalization strategies 
within a single national environment. Second, it points to the fact that the patterns of strategic 
choice are defined at the sectoral level and modified according to firm-specific characteristics. 
This allows for a more informed comparison of strategy across contexts. Finally, the model 
suggests a more ‘fine-grained’ approach to the understanding of the government role in 
shaping the emerging market firms’ competitive advantages and to explaining the existing 
heterogeneity in internationalization strategies of these firms on the basis of state-related 
drivers on the industry- and firm-level.  
Results 
The results of our analysis enable understanding of the vectors of the government influence 
on the CAs of Russian MNEs on the basis of grouping them in the empirically grounded 
framework (fig. 3). 
Figure 3 Empirically proved CAs of Russian MNEs explained by the government 
involvement 
Sectors in the 
group 
Interest of the state: 
how it shapes CAs 
Control of the state: 
how it shapes CAs 
Other influences of the 
state on CAs 
Electricity; 
military; 
mining; oil 
and gas 
Interest is high 
CAs are based on the 
domestic 
monopolistic position 
of these sectors’ 
firms, which is 
supported by the state. 
Control is high 
CAs are based on the 
prevention of 
domestic competition 
and protection of the 
foreign operation 
through political tools. 
Government 
representatives often 
participate in the boards 
of these companies, 
which provides these 
firms with direct 
‘contact’ with the state. 
Banking; IT; 
metallurgy; 
telecom 
Interest is high 
CAs are based on the  
attempt to develop (or 
rather initiate the self-
development of these 
sectors’ firms) and 
limited support 
(financial or 
technological) where 
possible. 
Control is low 
CAs are based on non-
intervention 
domestically and the 
relatively free market 
guaranteed at home. 
 
These firms demonstrate 
the most obvious 
international results, 
moving abroad on their 
own. This is why the 
state does not prevent 
their expansion, since 
their global integration is 
in line with state policy, 
while not providing any 
significant support.   
Education; 
media; sport 
Interest is low 
CAs are based on the 
development by these 
sectors’ companies 
(where significant 
physical investment is 
not necessary) of 
managerial and 
marketing 
competencies and 
skills as opposed 
Control is high 
CAs are based on the 
willingness of the 
state to manage what 
happens in these 
sectors, and hence on 
the companies’ chance 
to benefit from 
government support 
(mostly in image-
building and 
management  
While the development 
of these sectors is crucial 
socially, the state is not 
really interested in these 
firms’ development, 
where short-term profits 
are low or absent. 
Internationalization may 
help to improve these 
sectors, without the state 
investing.   
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What justifies this answer is that, while official statistics show a decline in state 
ownership, there is also strong evidence of a considerable increase of control by the Russian 
government over the largest enterprises of the country. The Russian government justifies this 
by claiming to create large, vertically integrated structures that are fit to survive international 
competition, as well to foster diversification of industry away from its present dependence on 
natural resources. 
Comparing Russia’s performance in international competition with other emerging 
multinationals is something of a rarity. Broad conclusions tend to be seen as premature 
because internationalizing is not yet an established discipline in Russia, and this generalizing 
on the international results of Russian MNEs remains limited. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article contributes to analysis in this area by highlighting government-related aspects of 
the competitiveness of Russian MNEs. Even when they go abroad with strong product 
capabilities and a proactive managerial style, they still benefit from home-country 
institutional resources for building competitive advantages. We see the strength of our 
empirical findings in the ability to facilitate understanding of the origins and prospects of CAs 
of emerging MNEs. Further analysis can be based on the placing (or re-placing) of new 
companies from other industries in the four sections of the matrix we have developed in this 
paper. 
We also see this paper having a number of theoretical contributions. First, we extend the 
theorizing on international competitiveness of emerging multinationals by outlining the nature 
of competitive advantage of Russian MNEs. Hence, we contribute to the debate on whether 
EMNEs are distinctive in the manner of building international competitiveness or follow a 
similar logic to developed market MNEs. Second, while the literature emphasizes that 
institutional forces shape the internationalization of EMNEs, they have not been 
comprehensively linked to explaining the nature and origin of competitive advantages. We 
address this gap by examining an integrated influence that home government factors (namely, 
control and interest) exert in enabling firms to compete abroad. Finally, we contribute 
knowledge about the behavior of Russian firms, which is one of the less researched areas in 
the field of international management.  
Third, this paper makes an attempt to illustrate the value of multi-level research by 
integrating macro- and firm-level determinants and including industry-specific determinants 
that allow for more comprehensive conclusions. This approach enables for a better 
understanding of the variety of EMNEs’ strategies and of government forces influencing 
competitive advantages of these firms.  Finally, we bring more knowledge about the 
behaviour of Russia firms that is currently one of the less researched contexts in the field of 
international management.  
Automotive; 
construction; 
fast food; 
logistics  
Interest is low 
CAs are based on the 
need to develop the 
companies’ own 
marketing mix and 
brands, which may 
compensate for the 
lack of state interest. 
Control is low 
CAs are based on the 
chance to attract 
investment (which is 
needed in these 
sectors) and to co-
operate 
internationally, 
without any serious 
government 
restriction.  
These firms are potential 
profit-makers through 
partnerships. Domestic 
investors are not 
interested (as a rule) in 
these sectors, and the 
state promotes the 
international 
collaboration of these 
firms.   
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Overall, with reference to the debate about the distinctive nature of EMNEs’ strategies, 
we stress that scholars need to differentiate more systematically between the existing 
approaches to internationalization strategies with the objective of explicitly addressing the 
variety in these approaches. The paper also has value for companies’ strategists as it provides 
them with understanding of the complexity of government-related determinants influencing 
the internationalization process of their firms and the types of competitive advantages to be 
developed or supported. It also provides a practical tool for modeling their strategy formation 
and accounting for different types of state influences on competitive position in the global 
marketplace. 
 
15 
 
References 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. 2008. Transforming disadvantages into advantages: 
Developing countries MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of international 
Business Studies, 39(6): 957-979. 
Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. 2008. Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the 
multinational enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4): 573-593. 
Filippov, S., & Duysters, G. 2011. Competence-building in foreign subsidiaries: The 
case of new EU member states. Journal for East European Management Studies, 16(4): 286-
314. 
Gaur, A. S., Kumar, V. and Sarathy, R. 2011. Liability of foreignness and 
internationalisation of emerging market firms. Advances in International Management, 24: 
211-233. 
Gaur, A.S., Kumar, V., & Singh, D. 2014. Institutions, resources and 
internationalization of emerging economy firms. Journal of World Business, 49: 12-20. 
Goldstein, A., & Pusterla, F. 2008. Emerging economies’ multinationals: general 
features and specificities of the Brazilian and Chinese cases. CESPRI, Università 
Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, WP № 223. 
Gugler, Ph., & Boie, B. 2008. The emergence of Chinese FDI: Determinants and 
strategies of Chinese MNEs. Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Jormanainen, I., & Koveshnikov, A. 2012. International activities if emerging market 
firms: A critical assessment of research in top management journals. Management 
International Review, 52(5): 691-725. 
Kalotay, K., & Sulstarova, A. 2010. Modelling Russian outward FDI. Journal of 
International Management, 16(2): 131–142. 
Latukha, M. 2014. Talent management in Russian companies: Domestic challenges and 
international experience. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, online 
publication, 5 Jun. 
Lu, J., Liu, X., & Wang, H. 2010. Motives for outward FDI of Chinese private firms: 
Firm resources, industry dynamics, and government policies. Management and Organization 
Review, 7(2): 223-248. 
Luo, Y., Xue, Q., & Han, B. 2010. How emerging market governments promote 
outward FDI: Experience from China. Journal of World Business, 45(2): 68–79. 
Panibratov, A. 2009. Internationalization process of Russian construction industry: 
Inward investments perspective. Journal for East European Management Studies, 2: 210-228. 
Panibratov, A. 2012. Russian Multinationals: From Regional Supremacy to Global 
Lead. London, New York: Routledge. 
Panibratov, A., & Kalotay, K. 2009. Russian outward FDI and its policy context, in 
Columbia FDI Profiles, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. 
Columbia University: October 13. 
16 
 
Panibratov, A., & Verba, C. 2011. Russian banking sector: Key points of international 
expansion. Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, 2(1): 63-74. 
Rasiah, R., Gammeltoft, P., & Jiang, Y. 2010. Home government policies for outward 
FDI from emerging economies: Lessons from Asia. International Journal of Emerging 
Markets, 5(3/4): 333-357. 
Settles, A., & Gurkov, I. 2011. Strategy and organization in Russian corporations. 
International Studies of Management and Organization, 41(4): 3-19. 
Vahtra, P., & Liuhto, K. 2006. An overview of Russia’s largest corporations abroad. In: 
K. Liuhto (Ed.), Expansion or exodus – why do Russian corporations invest abroad? New 
York, International Business Press. 
Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment. 2009. Russians 
multinationals continue their outward expansion in spite of financial crisis. 
Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & Wright, M. 2012. Exploring the role of 
government involvement in outward FDI from emerging economies. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 43(7): 655–676. 
Yang, X., Jiang, Y., Kang, R., & Ke, Y. 2009. A comparative analysis of the 
internationalization of Chinese and Japanese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
26(1): 141-162. 
Yaprak, A., & Karademir, B. 2011. The emerging market multinationals’ role in 
facilitating developed country multinationals’ regional expansion: A critical review of the 
literature and Turkish MNC examples. Journal of World Business, 46(5): 438-446. 
 
